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3Abstract
Based on the various works on the relevance of the institutional 
arrangements for a country’s economic performance, this paper 
studies the role and the determinantsof the reformpolicies for the 
development paths of the transition countries. Looking at the 
U.S.S.R breakdown as an extremely powerful “experiment” and 
considering the nature of its consequences, thepaper investigates 
the importance of policy reforms for the productivity 
growthlooking for possible structural break and differences 
amongof the nations in transit. The paper studies the different 
patterns of reforms using a synthetic measure treated 
asendogeneous andinstrumented by the rents coming from the 
natural endowments, the extent of the democratic progress and the 
trade openness.The paperprovesthat these determinantshave played 
a different role in explaining the pattern of reform policies of the 
transition countries, which in turn has affected their productivity 
growth paths.Empirically, the paper develops a dynamic approach 
implementing the more advanced econometric techniques. 
JEL: C33, E02, O11, O43, P20, Q30. 
Key words: economic growth, institutions, reforms,transition 
economies, dynamic models, panel analysis. 

5Introduction
One of the most remarkable results of the recent years of research 
is the positive relationship between institutions and development 
(North; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson; Hall and Jones; Rodrik; 
Easterly; among others). Several works have proved empirically 
the positive effect institutions have on the countries growth 
processes and the paths undertaken by the literature shows that 
working in a historical perspective is fruitful for several 
standpoints. In particular, it suggests the role of institutional 
arrangements could be further determined if we might observe a 
“structural” change of institutions and study what this has entailed 
for subsequent economic patterns.  
Transition economies are an extraordinary case of structural 
change of institutions. These countries lived for many years under 
the Communist rule, which had its own political and economic 
imperatives, and when these regimes were removed they had to 
face a new “reality” demanding new governments, new institutions 
and a transition to market economies. 
The literature1 has studied thoroughly the economic challenges of 
these countries focusing theoretically on the causes of the initial 
output collapse (among others, Blanchard and Kremer, 1997; 
Calvo and Coricelli, 1996; Gaddy and Ickes, 1998; Marin and 
Schnitzer, 1999) and empirically on the role of initial conditions 
and reforms strategies (liberalisation) in explaining output 
performance (De Melo et al. 1996, 2001; Fischer, Sahay and Vegh, 
1996, 2000;  Selowsky and Martin, 1997; Staehr, 2005; Lee and 
Jeong, 2006).Moreover, considering that the variation of the 
economic performance of these countries could be also determined 
by the new created institutional environment, the literature on 
transitionhas dealtwith the importance of institutions for their 
economic outcomes(Havrylyshyn and Van Rooden, 2003; Di 
Tommaso, Raiser, Weeks, 2007; Redek and Susjan, 2005, 
2008;Pistor, Raiser, Gelfer, 2000; Hoff and Stiglitz, 2004). 
1 For a comprehensive review, see Campos and Coricelli, 2002. 
6Institutions in these works are defined in different ways and can be 
either various indicators of the extent of economic freedom or 
measures of the democratic process and protection of property 
rights. Although their results confirm the existence of a positive 
relationship between institutional arrangements and economic 
performance, none of them provides the basis for a conceptual 
framework to analyze the impact of institutions on the economic 
paths of the transition countries. Exceptions are Beck and Laeven 
(2006) and Eicher and Schreiber (2010), who tackle this issue 
providing respectively a first study of the determinants of the 
institutional variation across theireconomies and a first attempt to 
capture the contemporary short term effects of a precise set of 
institutions via a panel methodology. 
Our paper, motivated by these approaches and their results, offers a 
novel explanation of why the so called transition economies exhibit 
such different stages in terms of institutional development(i.e. 
Estonia vs. Uzbekistan; Czech Republic vs. Moldova; Hungary vs. 
Turkmenistan, and so on) and provides further evidence on their 
importance for economic growth.Considering a specific part of the 
institutional environment (as Eicher and Schreiber, 2010), namely 
the institutions which rule the economic activity, those economic 
agents look at when they have to take economic decisions,we 
wonder about their status quo, about which forces have shaped 
their profile (as Beck and Laeven, 2006). Our hypothesis is that 
three main factors have affected the institutional development of 
the nations in transit. First, as communism means that everything is 
controlled, “commanded”, by the state, by what can be called 
political power, we conjecture that the countries, where the past 
elites remained in power, where authoritarian presidential 
administrations exist, where democratization process is very slow 
or even a “dream”, they also have known an equally slow 
institutional development. Second, some of the transition 
economiesare endowed with the presence of natural resources, 
whose extraction is typically controlled by state authorities. Since 
this clearly leads to widespread rent-seeking behaviour on the part 
of the government, which in turn leads to corruption - in a system 
7where bribery was already endemic – we hypothesize thatwhere 
there is abundance of natural resources, there is poor institutional 
development due to the incentives of the political elite to keep the 
economy “under control” in order to secure economic rents. Third, 
other incentives to reform the economic system are thought to 
come from the countries’ trade openness, from their trade 
relationships (Barlow, 2006). As the degree of trade openness of 
the transition economies, especially that of the Former Soviet 
Union ones, was very low,because their partners largely belonged 
to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), we 
conjecture thatthe incentives coming from the trade relations with 
more advanced market economies have been another potential 
force for the institutional development.In other words, we 
hypothesise that theinstitutional arrangements of the countries 
engaged in trade relations with moreadvanced market economies 
are more developed. 
This paper shows that among the transition economies, these three 
dimensions have affected the evolution of the institutional 
arrangements, which in turn has to a certain extent affected their 
growth paths. Our work offers a novel approach to the explanation 
of the endogeneity of the institutions building in the transition 
countries. Moreover, we investigate whether,among these 
countries, the new institutional arrangements have played a 
different role. Focusing on the historical perspective, we decide to 
make a distinction between Former Soviet Union (FSU) countries 
and Central Eastern European (CEE) ones.In fact, the former are 
heritage of the Soviet Union, the latter are the so called Eastern 
bloc, i.e. countries that have “just” experienced Communism. The 
former had a common history; the latter had a soviet influence in 
common, which however affected them differently. Due to this, we 
cannot think the CEE countries lived central planning in the same 
radical way. Since the U.S.S.R. breakdown is a unique and 
extraordinary event due to its seventy years history of systematic 
cohesion among political system, economic policy and economic 
structure, we examine whether this heritage has conditioned the 
importance of the new institutional landscape. For this reason, the 
8analysis of the institutional determinants and the study of their 
impact on the economic growth is donecontrolling also for 
country-group. 
As Eicher and Schreiber, we follow the leading approach of the 
literature about the link between growth and institutions (Hall and 
Jones, 1999;  Acemoglu et al., 2002, 2005) and focus only on the 
role of institutions to catch the economic change due to the 
institutional development.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents 
our theoretical framework. Starting from the data,we also provide 
some empirical evidence. Section 3 presents the specification of 
the model, our econometric methodology and describes the 
variables used. Section 4 shows the estimation results. Section 5 
concludes.
1. Institutions, reform policies and their determinants 
In the literature, during these years of research, the word 
“institution” has received different names; it has been related to 
different part of the institutional environment. Institution mayrefer 
to the political system, to the economic system or, generally 
speaking, to all the outcomes of the normative behaviour of the 
government.Moreover, it happens that the same measure is 
associated with different labels, according to the purpose of the 
study.However, although researchers have studied different 
features of the institutional structure and called themin different 
ways, we all know that institutions have an unique theoretical 
meaning, from which we start to explain our conceptual and 
empirical analysis. 
Northtaught us that “institutions are the rules of the game of the 
society”. More precisely, “they define the choice set and determine 
transaction and production costs and, hence, the profitability and 
feasibility of engaging in economic activity”. At the beginning of 
the 1990s, the transition countries experienced the end (at least 
formally) of a specific set of institutions. The Communist 
9experiment ended and this automatically led to the collapse, for all 
of them2,of a specific typology of “economic institutions”, central
planning. This “change” had its extreme expression for the Former 
Soviet Republics, which were together characterized by the same 
administrative decisions, management and control, where the Plans 
were the main instrument of strategic development. This central 
and hierarchical planning of the economic activity, established 
with the Revolution (1917) and maintained during the years of the 
authoritarian-dictatorial regime (until 1990), inspired the 
economies of the States of Eastern Europe, which in turn became 
Communist regimes at around the end of the World War II.Twenty 
years ago, the U.S.S.R. breakdown engendered a great historical 
change that entailed a transition from something, the past, to 
something else, the new realities formed, which leapt into the 
unknown, the market economy system.From this common 
background, which can be analytically conceived as exogenous, the 
Former Soviet Republics and the countries of the Eastern bloc 
needed an institutional change, new “rules of the game” for the 
economic activity. 
On this basis, we study the pattern of reform of these countries, 
whose outcome, the result of the reform policies implemented by 
each of them, is precisely what North means: that is, what 
economic agents see and take into account when they engage in the 
economic activity. Our measure of reform policies, following 
Eicher and Schreiber (2010)3, is a synthetic one and it is defined 
using the E.B.R.D. (European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development) indices of assessment in nine areas: small and large-
scale privatisation, governance and enterprise restructuring, price 
liberalisation, trade and foreign exchange system, competition 
policy, banking reform and interest rate liberalisation, securities 
market and non bank financial institutions, and infrastructure. They 
are concretely related to the functioning of the economic system 
and their values, measuring the degree of development (reform) 
2 The Former Soviet Republics and the former Communist states of Eastern and 
Central Europe. 
3 They call them “structural policies”. 
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reached by a particular country in a given year, let necessarily 
think of the hands of the policy makers, of their efforts, and the 
quality of the policies implemented.  
The E.B.R.D. grades, on a scale of 1 to 4+, each country in a given 
year along these nine dimensions. Because these indices are highly 
correlated, our measure is a composite index. For each country, we 
sum the value of each indicator in one year and normalize the 
aggregate index obtained, so that it ranges from 04 to 1. This 
procedure gives an immediate sense of the level of the reform 
policies, with low values meaning persistence of the characteristics 
of the past and high values suggesting standards of the more 
advanced market economies. For instance, countries like Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia have 
reached a satisfying stage since their governments have boosted the 
reform policies; countries like Belarus, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan, instead, fall behind, with limited reform efforts. 
Figure 1 - Reform Policies Index over 1991-2008 period.
4The minimum value is 0.23095. 
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On the whole, the transition countries have known different 
reforms paths, as the reform policies have been implemented at 
different speeds and with different commitments.Why some 
transition economies have spurred reforms, while others are reform 
hostile? Which are the reasons behind their status-quo? And, above 
all, is this institutional change necessary for growth for all these 
countries? May its effect decrease over time? 
Our framework,studying the incentives of the ruling elites, features 
a novel account of the creation of these new institutional 
arrangements and provides evidence of their importance according 
to the group considered.We hypothesise that their key three 
determinants are the rents coming from the natural resources, the 
nature of the political system (autocracy versus democracy) and the 
extent of the trade openness.
Natural resources. The issue of natural resources is well-studied in 
literature (Sachs and Warner, 1995; Sala-i-Martin, 1997; Gylfason, 
2001; Auty, 2001) and it is common to refer to it in terms of “curse 
of natural resources”: richly endowed countries tend to have bad 
economic performances.  
In particular, the theoretical idea brought out by the literature is 
that the abundance of natural resources is likely to develop 
mechanisms which in turn lead to fall victim to the curse (Mikesell, 
1997; Auty and Gelb, 2001). The natural resources phenomenon 
and the deterministic relationship between growth and natural 
resources have been studied also for the transition economies, 
finding evidence for the curse (Kronenberg, 2004; Esanov et al. 
2001) and against it (Brunnschweiler, 2009). But what the 
literature does not say for the transition economies, which would 
be more relevant,is whether or not they have conditioned their 
reform policies and thus injured growth (as done for Sub-Saharan 
African countries by Dalmazzo and De Blasio, 2001). In other 
words, we wonder whether natural resources abundance has 
hampered the reform policies. Our hypothesis is that among 
transition economies the incentives of the government to reform 
decrease when the rents coming from natural resources increase. 
Reasoning in terms of the channels of transmission for the curse, 
12
our insight is that the typical state control of the concessions 
related to the extraction of natural resources encourages corrupt 
and rent-seeking behaviour in the government and the political 
elites in order to protect theirown interests, which in turn leads to a 
“massive distortion” (Kronenberg, 2004) of the economic system 
and to a block of reform. 
Trade relations. The end of central planning means, at least 
theoretically, the simultaneous integration into the world economy 
and the relations with advanced market economies. Some papers 
have dealt with the importance of trade in transition (Kaminski, 
1996; Kaminski et al., 1996) and the positive role of the trade 
reform policies on the economic outcome when followed by 
“external and internal reform” (Barlow, 2006). The openness to 
other countries and the commercial international relations are of 
great importance for the nations in transit. In fact, the centrally 
controlled system suppressed trade with market economies and 
allowed trade only between Communist countries (organized by 
the CMEA). In our paper, we aim at understanding whether the 
economic (trade) relations with advanced market economies have 
affected the reform processes. Sincetransition countries are likely 
to be diverse in terms of the nature of their trade relations, we can 
imagine that these commercial contacts have affected and 
conditioned the actions of the policy makers of these countries. 
More developed relations with advanced market economies require 
a progressive liberalization, namelyto reform the institutional 
arrangements implementing reform policies. It is clear that the 
extent of the trade openness depends on whether or not there is a 
direct involvement in exports and imports by ministries and state-
owned trading companies. Where it does exist, there will be very 
few commercial relations and a low trade openness. Where there 
are no administrative restrictions, the degree of openness will be 
greater and this will lead to a general and progressive improvement 
of the institutional structure. If to protect their economic interests, 
the government dictates restrictions on the international trade, the 
degree of openness to the advanced market economies will be 
reduced and this will penalize the reform process. If the 
13
government has no particular economic interests to protect, it has 
no need to avoid the international competition and its policy 
measures will encourage the reform paths.The following table 
(Table 1) exhibits the correlation coefficients between the reforms 
index and the first two supposed determinants: natural resources 
are negatively correlated with reforms (the coefficient is higher for 
the Former Soviet Union countries), whereas trade relations with 
advanced economies are positively correlated with them. It is 
noteworthy that as for the former the degree of correlation is higher 
for the Former Soviet Republic; as for the latter, higher for the 
countries of the so called Eastern bloc. 
Table 1 - Pairwise Correlation Coefficients 
All
natural
resources 
rents (% 
of GDP) 
Oil & 
natural
gas
rents (% 
of
GDP)
Share of 
Euro area 
imports by 
partner 
(%)
Share of 
Euro area 
exports by 
partner (%)
   
All
sample 
Correlation
coefficient -0.3627 -0.3658 0.3473 0.4577 
Significance 
level 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N 468 468 468 468 
Reform 
policies
index
Fsu
countries
Correlation
coefficient -0.5643 -0.5702  0.1393 0.1981 
Significance 
level 0.0000 0.0000 0.0220 0.0011 
N 270 270 270 270 
Cee
countries
Correlation
coefficient -0.3225 -0.2681  0.6209 0.6104 
Significance 
level 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
N 198 198 198 198 
Democratization. Other incentives to reform the economy depend 
on how political power is allocated by one country’s political 
institutions, namely if they allocate an excessive power to a small 
group or even to a single person (Acemoglu et al., 2005). It 
14
becomes clear that if political power accrues to few people, their 
incentives will be to act in order to protect their particular interests 
and not to further those of the majority of the population. The 
literature on transition explains in different ways that the 
abandonment of past institutional arrangements, that is the 
abandonment of the centralized control of the economy in behalf of 
liberalization (De Melo et al. 2001, among others), has benefited 
these countries, their per capita GDP. Therefore, we can gather that 
in those countries where political power of the elite is not 
threatened by any political opposition or by institutions 
themselves, the elite will use its power to secure economic rents 
and income, and will have no incentive to reform the economic 
environment, which would automatically reduce their rents and 
benefit most people. Thus, we hypothesise that among transition 
countries, self-interested autocratic system and authoritarian 
political structure are another determinant of the reform policies 
path. It can be noticed (Figure 2) that reforms and democratization 
paths tend in most cases to coincide. 
These three determinants are of course inevitably interrelated. The 
combination of non democratic institutions, which allocate political 
power to a small self-interested autocratic elite, with economic 
interests to protect (that are likely to come from both rents of 
natural resources and returns of state-owned dominant firms) drive 
the reform policies and shape the institutional development of 
these countries. Our analysis proves that these determinants have 
conditioned the reform policies of the transition countries (namely 
the Central Eastern European and the Former Soviet ones) and that 
their incremental evolution (North, 1990) has in turn affected their 
growth paths with some exceptions. 
15
Figure 2 - The Index and the Democratization Path. 
2. Econometric Analysis 
Our analysis focuses on the twenty-six transition economies, over 
the 1991-2008 period, and examines the importance of the reform 
policies for the growth paths of the transition countries.Drawing on 
the evidence (Eicher and Schreiber, 2010) of positive relation 
between institutional development and economic growth, we like 
studying by means ofseveralregressions whether the reform 
policies (synthesized in the composite index explained above) have 
shaped differently the growth paths of the transition economies 
according to the twoidentified groups and whether there exists a 
structural breakafter the first few years following the USSR 
breakdown.More specifically, regarding the countries group, 
considering their different historical experience of central
planning, we believe that the proper distinction is that between 
Central Eastern European countries and the Former Soviet 
Republics.Regarding the structural break, it is worth noting that the 
period immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union generally 
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saw a massive dislocation with GDP per capita collapsing, 
followed by a rapid recovery and then a steadier rate of growth. 
Hence,there may be a structural break that deserves investigation. 
To establish whether the “dislocation” period exists, the levels of 
GDP per capitawere examined and because,as expected, the first 
few years after the breakdown (1991-1996)seem “abnormal”, we 
take account of this evidence introducing a dummy in the 
appropriate regressions. 
Theoretically, talking about growth means reasoning in terms of 
production function, which implies to think of productivity. We 
employ two measures of economic performance:the GDP per 
person employed5, namely the gross domestic product divided by 
total employment in the economy, expressed in PPP terms 
(purchasing power parity GDP converted to 1990 constant 
international dollars using PPP rates) and our measure of TFP. 
Total Factor Productivity is defined in the usual way as ??? ?
? ????????? , where ? is output, ? capital, ? labour; ? ? ? is the 
capital share and ? the labour share of income (a constant ? equal 
to 0.66)6. Output is measured by GDP (constant 2000 US$)7,
labour by the labour force8 and physical capital stock by the 
inventory equation ?? ? ?? ? ?? ? ??????, where ? is investment 
and ? the depreciation rate9. Following the literature, the initial 
value of capital stock is set equal to ?? ? ?? ?? ? ??? , where ?? is 
the value of investment the first available year, ? the investment 
average growth rate over the estimation period10. To check the 
soundness and reliability of TFP measure, we regress the growth of 
5 Source: World Development Indicators Database. 
6 It is common in the literature to assume a constant labour share of two-thirds. 
7 Source: World Development Indicators Database. 
8 Labour Force, Total. Source: World Development Indicators Database. 
9 As it is usual in the literature, we assume a depreciation rate of 6%. 
10As the time interval between the first year with available data and the first year 
of the estimation period (Caselli, 2005) is less than five years, Luintel and Khan 
(2004) are followed and the average growth rate of investment over the estimation 
period is used. 
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GDP on the growth of TFP and finding a close relationship11 we 
use also these series to assess the growth of productivity. 
But before proceeding with the core analysis of the paper, we like 
exploring the impact of the reform policies on the productivity 
growth of these countriesfirst via a non parametric test and then via 
some preliminary cross-country regressions.The reform policies 
index is constructed by valuing the degree of structural change on a 
scale of 1 to 4+ and creating a composite index. In a sense, this is 
an ordinal measure than a cardinal one: a value of two shows 
greater market liberalisation than a value of one (an ordinal 
measure) but it is not twice as great (a cardinal measure). We treat 
the index as an ordinal measure and determine the strength of 
association between reforms and the growth paths by computing 
the Spearman rank correlation between the average growth rate of 
productivity (both measures) and the average value of the index. 
This is done over the whole period (1991-2008), thedislocation one 
(1991-1996) and the remainder of that12 (Table 2). As the results 
reveal, the null of independence can be rejected only for the very 
first years since independence, whereas after 1996 and over the 
whole period there seem to be no relationship between them. This 
suggests it is worth investigating where the relationship breaks 
down and whether there exists a difference between the Central 
Eastern European countries and the Former Soviet Republics. 
11 The estimated coefficient is positive and high statistically significant 
(coefficient = 0.7560, standard error = 0.0316, t-statistics = 23.91) with and 
adjusted R-Squared of 0.5658. 
12 Figures are reported in tables (Appendix A, Table A1, Table A2, Table A3). 
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Table 2 - Spearman Rank Correlation 
1991-1996 1997-2008 1991-2008   
Reform
policies 
index
Average
growth
rate  
Gdp per 
person 
employed 
Spearman’s
rho
0.6834 
( 0.1490 ) 
-0.3361   
(0.1923)
0.2752    
(0.1962)
Test of H0
t(24)= 
4.5862 
p-val=0.00 
t(24)= 
1.7481 
p-val =0.09 
t(24)= 
1.4024 
p-val= 0.17 
N 26 26 26 
Average
growth
rate TFP 
Spearman’s
rho
0.5494 
(0.1706) 
-0.3190   
(0.1935)
0.1562    
(0.2016)
Test of H0
t(24)= 
3.2212 
p-val= 0.00 
t(24)= 
1.6488 
p-val= 0.11 
t(24)= 
0.7749 
p-val= 0.44 
N 26 26 26 
The next table (Table 3) provides evidence of the effect of the 
reform policies index at the beginning of the period on subsequent 
growth. We run cross-countries regressions of the growth rate of 
productivity over the 1991-2008 (measured either by GDP per 
person employed or by our computed measure of TFP) against the 
initial value of the index (1991). We also define a group dummy 
(Fsu, which takes value 1 if the country is a Former Soviet 
Republic) to discover potential differences between the two groups 
of transition countries. The estimation output shows that the initial 
effect of the reforms index differ significantly across countries.In 
particular, it is interesting to note thatwhen the country dummy is 
included, the data rejectsthe hypothesis that the slopes of the 
Central Eastern European Countries and the Former Soviet 
Republics are equal.  
Then, to see whether there are cyclical fluctuations in the growth of 
productivity that generate noise and mask the time-series 
relationship between productivity growth and the level of the 
reform policies index, we calculate the growth rates over sub-
periods of six years and run regressions of these average growth 
rates on the average value of the index over the same sub-periods 
(Table 4). The estimated coefficient is always statistically 
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significant. This confirms that there is a short-term relationship 
between the regressor and the productivity growth,and the slope 
dummies for the two sub-periods show that reforms policies have a 
different effect over time:reforms matter more at the beginning of 
transition than afterwards. The estimated slopes say that the 
reforms impact decreases over time (columns III and VI, Table 4). 
On the whole, these results show that the reforms policies seem to 
affect differently, across groups and over time, the economic 
performance of the nations in transit. Our next step is to check the 
insights arising from these preliminary results and estimating the 
annual impact of the reforms improvement. 
Table3 - Cross-Country Evidence of the Initial Effect of Reforms 
 Dependent variable 
Gdp per person employed Total factor productivity 
??????????? ??????????? ??????????? ???????????
??? ??????)  .1271**   
(.0534) 
 .0811**   
(.0363) 
????????? .0198   
(.0124) 
-.0318   
(.0215) 
.0015   
(.0090) 
-.0174    
(.0151) 
????????? ? ???  .1139**   
(.0450) 
 .0655**   
(.0303) 
???????? yes yes yes yes 
N 26 26 26 26 
R-squared 0.0684 0.2314 0.010 0.0888 
F-test p-value 0.1230 0.1043 0.8686 0.1679 
Superscripts */**/*** denote 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels.  
Number in parenthesis are robust standard errors. 
The reform index is expressed in logarithmic terms. 
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Table 4 - Long-term versus short-term relationships 
Dependent variable 
Gdp per person employed Total factor productivity 
I II III IV V VI 
????? ?????? ?????? ????? ?????? ??????
???????   .1033**   
(.0408) 
  .0905 
(.0552) 
???????   .0220*   
(.0125) 
  .0094    
(.0123) 
????????????? .1205***   
(.0228) 
.2535***   
(.0328) 
.1188*   
(.0669) 
.0978***   
(.0283) 
.2158***   
(.0443) 
.0610    
(.0849) 
?????????????
? ???????
  .1924***   
(.0334) 
  .1919***   
(.0459) 
?????????????
? ???????
  .0435*   
(.0233) 
  .0353**   
(.0167) 
???????? yes yes yes yes yes yes 
N 78 78 78 78 78 78 
R-squared 0.3368 0.7035 0.8180 0.2352 0.5124 0.6232 
F-test p-
value
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Superscripts */**/*** denote 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels. Number in parenthesis 
are robust standard errors.The dependent variables are the average growth rates of GDP per 
person employed and of TFP over 1991-1996 (1992 in case of TFP), 1997-2002, 2003-2008. 
The average values of the index are calculated over the same periods.The reform index is 
expressed in logarithmic terms. 
2.1 Dynamic Panel Estimation 
To get information about the effect of reforms policies 
development on economic performance, our analysis relies on 
panel methods. This methodology, taking into account both the 
cross-sectional and time variation, provides an exhaustive 
investigation of the ongoing incremental effect of reform policies 
on the countries’ economic growth. In the literature on transition, 
this strategy has been completely followed only by Eicher and 
Schreiber (2010), who are the first to analyse the growth paths of 
the transition countries via a dynamic specification, over the 1991-
2001 period. 
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As said before, our dataset consists of the twenty-six nations in 
transit studied over the 1991-2008 period and since the institutional 
arrangements, outcome of the reform policies implemented by the 
governments of thesecountries, are explicitlynot recognized as 
exogenous in our framework, we develop formal econometric 
methods to deal with endogeneity. 
To assess the different impact of the reform policies on growth 
rates, according to the group of countries considered, we use the 
system GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998; Bond et al., 
2001; Bond, 2002), whose crucial feature among others is to 
deliver un-biased coefficients in presence of endogenous 
independent variables.  
Our equation model is:  
???? ? ? ? ??????? ? ??????? ? ?? ? ?? ? ???????????????????????????????????????(1)
where ???? is productivity growth (exponential growth rates, both 
measures) in country i at time t ; ?????? is the reform policies index 
for the country i at time t-1, expressed in logarithmic terms, to 
study the impact of the policies implemented on the following 
growth outcome; ?? captures country-specific effects and ?? the 
time trend13.
The model is first estimated considering all the transition countries 
and thendefining a country-group dummy (Fsu dummy) and a 
slope dummy variable(period b, 1997-2008) for the period 
following the dislocation one (1991-1996) to look for possible 
different impacts between the Eastern European and Former Soviet 
countries and over time, respectively.Then, we follow our 
theoretical analysis of thedeterminants of governments’ incentives 
to reform, based on the cross-sectionalapproach of Beck and 
Laeven (2006), and define ad-hoc instruments to develop in a 
panel setting a comprehensive explanation of the commitments to 
13 Time fixed effects are not included. The rationale for that will be explained later 
on.
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reform.Inspired by the hierarchy of institutions identification 
strategy of Eicher and Schreiber (2010), we regress our index of 
reform policies on the variables quantifying the rents coming from 
natural resources, the nature of the political institutions and the 
extent of the trade relations with advanced market economies. This 
allows to understand their particular role according to the group-
specific transition path and provides the econometricfoundation to 
get a differently instrumented weight of the reform policies 
implemented. From the empirical point of view, the importance of 
natural resources is measured both by the total (oil, natural gas, 
coal, mineral and forest) natural resource rents (as percentage of 
GDP) and the oil and natural gas rents (as percentage of GDP) 
from the World Development Indicators Database.Natural 
resources rents are defined as the difference between the value of 
the natural resource production at world prices and total costs of 
production. These variables explicitly assessing the rents accruing 
to the governments are the right measure of what leads to the rent-
seeking behaviour of the political elites.The nature of the political 
institutions is caught by the holistic polity2 variable of the Polity 
IV Project Database, which on a scale from -10 to +10 says the 
degree of democracy and autocracy, meaning -10 “full autocracy” 
and +10 “full democracy”. This perspective envisions a spectrum 
of governing authority that spans from fully institutionalized 
autocracies (-10 to -6), through mixed authority regimes, 
anocracies(-5 to +5), to fully institutionalized democracies (+6 to 
+10). Finally, since there is no available evidence for all the 
transition countries of their trade relations with the world advanced 
market economies, we determine their extent by the share 
(percentage) of imports or exports (of all products) of the euro area 
(12 countries) by trade partners14(from the Eurostat Statistics 
Database15). We know this may not exhaust their tradeconnections 
with all the advanced economies, but it certainly tells their links 
14 The partners selected are of course the 26 nations in transit.  
15 Extra-Euro area trade by partner and by SITC product group Database. 
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with the “closest” ones and gives a less imperfect and biased 
information than the usual degree of openness indicators. 
3. Estimation Results 
We present the main estimation results concentrating first on the 
impact of the reform policies impact on the productivity growth of 
the transition countries (equation 1), and then on the study of the 
reforms determinants via a two-stages approach. 
Table 5 presents estimation results for the equation (1) on the 
sample of the 26 transition countries. The annual productivity 
growth (the exponential growth rate of the GDP per person 
employed and of total factor productivity) is regressed on the 
lagged value of the logarithm of productivity and the lagged 
measure of the reform policies index, expressed in logarithmic 
terms. The first dynamic regression (columns I and V) proves a 
highly statistically significant and positive role of the reform 
policies for the growth paths of all the transition countries (in line 
with Eicher and Schreiber, 2010) and additionally it tells that the 
institutional arrangements, result of the policies implemented by 
the governments of these countries, affect the following economic 
outcome: a one percent increase of the reform policies index raises 
the growth of productivity by .28 or .30 respectively,according on 
the measure of productivity considered. We decide to control for 
the group-specific transition path (columns II and VI), studying the 
slope coefficient of the structural variable whenthe group dummy 
(Fsu) is added.The index effect is now measured as 
??? ????? ? ?????  for the Central and Eastern European Countries, 
but ???? ? ??????? for the Former Soviet Republics. The 
differencebetween these values is the estimated coefficient ??????,
which is significantly different from zero and positive.This 
evidence thus confirms the hypothesis that the slopes of the 
country-groups profiles are different,suggesting that the synthetic 
index change its relevancewhether we consider the Former Soviet 
Republics or the countries belonging to the Eastern bloc. Reform 
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policieshave a strong influence on the productivity growth of the 
ex Soviet Republics, whereas it plays a weak role for the 
productivity rates of the former Communist states of Eastern 
Europe. This result may reflect the different meaning of central
planning between these two sets of countries: just the economies 
that lived under the Soviet system experienced the central-
hierarchical administration radically. Therefore, this evidence may 
be theoretically explained arguing that only where central planning 
had its “pure” expression, the progressive abandonment of its rules 
has played a significant role on the economic paths. 
Concerning the estimation strategy, we estimate this model 
(equation 1) employing the system GMM16, which is recognised to 
be the most coherent when dealing with “ the time series 
dimension of the data, non-observable country specific effects, the 
inclusion of a lagged dependent variable among the regressors and 
the possibility that all explanatory variables are endogenous” 
(Vieira et al. 2012). As suggested by Blundell and Bond (1998) 
and Bond (2002), we usehigher than two lags as instruments to 
control for measurement error and endogeneity, and because of the 
reduced dimension of our sample, we create one instrument for 
each variable and lag distance (rather than one for each time 
period, variable and lag distance) in order to avoid the over-fit bias, 
which happens when the number of instruments is large relative to 
the number of observations. In fact, analyses of the issues related 
to the use of weak and many instruments (Roodman, 2009; Vieira 
et al. 2012) have revealed that instruments proliferation does not 
succeed inwiping out the endogenous components of the 
endogenous regressors, causing biased coefficients. Also the 
Hansen and difference-in-Hansen tests can perform poorly in the 
presence of many instruments, resulting in high p-values (close or 
equal to one), whereas the Sargan (and of course the difference-in-
Sargan) cannot be weakened by their proliferation. But the problem 
is that the latter assumes homoschedasticity of errors for 
16 One-step System GMM. This choice is due to the small dimension of the 
sample. 
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consistency, which is not common and particularlyit is not our 
case.  
The empirical literature on the instruments proliferation has 
stressed that a rule of thumb to detect the use of an excessive 
number of instruments is to compare the number of countries with 
the number of instruments: there are too many instruments when 
the number of instruments is greater than the number of countries 
(Roodman, 2009). Therefore, given that the number of countries 
studied is low (26), to collapse the number of instruments but at the 
same time keep on assessing the proper impact of our endogenous 
regressor (reforms index) on the growth paths (which requires to 
use more than two lags), time dummiesare not included in the 
specification of our model17. Anyhow,as preliminary regressions 
reveal that the estimated coefficients of the time dummies are all in 
all alike, a compromise to overcome this drawback is to assume the 
restriction that each year dummy would have exactly the same 
coefficient, which simply involves adding a new artificial variable 
?? to the equation model (Equation 1) with the property of 
increasing by the same constant amount each period.Table 5 
reports the p-values for crucial specification tests, namely the 
Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions, the difference-in-
Hansen test, and the Arellano-Bond test for second order serial 
correlation in the error terms, which all allow an assessment of 
validity of our estimation strategy.  
17We are aware that time dummies are important as they make the assumption of 
no correlation across individuals more likely to hold, but we are obliged to 
exclude them in order to satisfy the conditions outlined above. In particular, their 
inclusion systematically leads to excessive number of instruments and high p-
values for the Hansen test and the difference in ones. 
26
Ta
bl
e 
5 
- D
yn
am
ic
 P
an
el
 D
at
a 
Es
tim
at
io
n,
 S
ys
te
m
 G
M
M
 
D
ep
en
de
nt
 V
ar
ia
bl
e:
 P
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
 g
ro
wt
h 
( ??
? )
 
G
dp
 p
er
 p
er
so
n 
em
pl
oy
ed
 
To
ta
l F
ac
to
r P
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
 
I
II
II
I
IV
V
VI
VI
I
VI
II
? 
(P
er
io
d)
  
-.0
12
8 
   
(.0
23
7)
 
-.0
01
3 
   
(.0
20
7)
 
-.0
05
4 
   
(.0
21
0)
 
.0
05
4 
  
 (.
01
92
) 
??
?
(d
um
m
y)
 
 
.1
67
8*
**
   
(.0
47
8)
 
.1
23
5*
**
   
(.0
31
5)
 
.1
41
0*
* 
   
(.0
52
7)
 
.0
93
8*
   
 
(.0
53
2)
 
? ?
?
?
.0
28
14
   
(.0
46
7)
 
-.0
08
4 
   
(.0
38
5)
 
-.0
41
3 
  
 (.
02
80
) 
-.0
61
3*
   
(.0
32
6)
 
.0
88
9 
   
(.0
65
3)
 
-.0
24
6 
  
 (.
04
61
) 
-.0
27
1 
   
(.0
32
4)
 
-.0
60
7 
   
 
(.0
57
2)
 
? ?
?
?
.2
88
8*
**
   
(.0
48
1)
 
.0
28
5 
   
(.0
67
7)
 
.1
47
6*
**
   
(.0
49
0)
 
-.0
43
8 
   
(.0
66
5)
 
.3
09
8*
**
   
(.0
66
4)
 
-.0
32
9 
   
(.0
64
1)
 
.1
15
1*
* 
  
(.0
46
6)
 
-.0
98
5 
   
(.0
58
9)
 
?
?
??
? ?
?
?
.2
72
8*
**
   
(.0
72
7)
 
.2
73
0*
**
   
(.0
55
2)
 
.2
63
1*
**
 
(.0
54
4)
 
.2
81
0*
**
   
(.0
47
9)
 
?
?
? ?
?
?
-.0
89
0*
* 
  
(.0
37
1)
 
-.0
52
2 
   
(.0
41
6)
 
-.0
87
0*
* 
  
(.0
32
5)
 
-.0
64
0 
   
(.0
39
9)
 
??
?
?
??
??
?
ye
s 
ye
s 
ye
s 
ye
s 
ye
s 
ye
s 
ye
s 
ye
s 
??
??
??
??
ye
s 
ye
s 
ye
s 
ye
s 
ye
s 
ye
s 
ye
s 
ye
s 
N
 
44
2 
44
2 
44
2 
44
2 
44
2 
44
2 
44
2 
44
2 
N
um
be
r o
f g
ro
up
s 
26
 
26
 
26
 
26
 
26
 
26
 
26
 
26
 
N
. o
f i
ns
tru
m
en
ts
 
22
 
23
 
23
 
24
 
22
 
23
 
23
 
24
 
F 
te
st
p-
va
lu
e 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
H
an
 te
st
p-
va
lu
e 
0.
40
0 
0.
19
4 
0.
15
5 
0.
21
3 
0.
41
6 
0.
13
9 
0.
15
2 
0.
14
6 
D
iff
 in
 H
an
se
n 
te
st
 
p-
va
lu
e 
0.
88
7 
0.
29
1 
0.
24
9 
0.
67
9 
0.
72
1 
0.
29
7 
0.
32
1 
0.
76
1 
A
R
(2
) t
es
tp
-v
al
ue
 
0.
45
0 
0.
56
5 
0.
47
9 
0.
57
6 
0.
27
0 
0.
29
8 
0.
36
1 
0.
33
8 
Su
pe
rs
cr
ip
ts
 *
/*
*/
**
* 
de
no
te
 1
0,
 5
, a
nd
 1
 p
er
ce
nt
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e 
le
ve
ls
. N
um
be
r i
n 
pa
re
nt
he
si
s a
re
 ro
bu
st
 st
an
da
rd
 e
rr
or
s.
27
Then, to explicitly test for any structural break in the model, we 
decide to include a dummy variable (period b) for the period 
following the dislocation one (1997 onwards). The regression 
results (Table 5, columns III and VII) show that ??? ????? ? ?????
is the estimated impact of the index during the so called dislocation 
period, whereas ???? ? ??????????? for the remainder of the series. 
The difference is given by ?????????? that is statistically significant 
and negative, confirming the existence of a structural break in the 
model. This evidence proves that reforms matter in the very first 
years after the Soviet Union breakdown but then their importance 
becomes negligible.The last regressions (Table 5, columns IV-
VIII) fully interact the core independent variable  ??????with both 
qualitative factors.The empirical tests reveal that there is no 
problem with second order autocorrelation and that the instruments 
are valid in all the estimated growth models, where we continue to 
control for the proliferation of instruments.  
On the whole, which lessons can be drawn from this evidence? 
Firstly, that the result of the reform policies implemented, namely 
what economic agents see and take into account when they engage 
in the economic activity, matter for the growth paths of the 
transition countries in the very first years of transition.Secondly, 
that it is fair to say that reforms have affected differently the 
transition pathsof these countries (i.e. Former Soviet Union 
Republics vs. Central Eastern European countries).  
Dealing with the endogeneity of the institutional dimension, we 
now investigate its determinants and discover which forces drive 
the incentives to reform of the governments of these countries. Our 
strategy is to define ad-hoc instruments to give a theoretical and 
empirical explanation to the different commitments to reforms, 
which are reflected by different values of our index, according to 
the country considered. 
To get an exhaustive picture of the relative importance of the 
supposed determinants according to the country-group considered, 
we start running some preliminary  regressions (Tables 6a and 6b). 
Then, we proceed performing a sort of two-stages approach. 
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Table 6a - Reforms Index Determinants 
Dependent Variable: Reform Policies Index (?? )
I II III IV V VI
??? (dummy) -.1123***(.0424) 
-.0884**
 (.0408) 
-.0614
(.0422) 
-.0315
 (.0273) 
-.2052***
(.0437) 
-.1655***
(.0384) 
??? ??????? ????????? ????????
.0404
(.3139) 
.0488
(.3062) 
-.1015**
(.0402) 
-.1227***
(.0421) 
-.1388***
(.0407) 
-.1264***
(.0404) 
????????????????
.4244***
(.1123) 
.8547***
(.1961) 
.6546***
(.1372) 
????????????????
.5543***
(.1420) 
.9475***
(.1587) 
.7552***
(.1434) 
?????????? ???????????????
.1567***
(.0221) 
.1600***
(.0212) 
.1650***
(.0206) 
.1787***
(.0231) 
.0670*
(.0366) 
.0740**
(.0349) 
????
.0352
(.0543) 
.0411
(.0558) 
.0458
(.0578) 
.0597
 (.0597) 
.0528
(.0566) 
.0563
 (.0576) 
??? ??????? ????????? ????????
? ???
-.1260
(.3112) 
-.1382
 (.3034)     
???????????????? ? ???
-.5984***
(.1970)    
???????????????? ? ???    
-.5252***
(.1719) 
?????????? ???????????????
? ???     
.1423***
(.0442) 
.1358***
(.0416) 
???????? yes yes yes yes yes yes 
???? ??????? yes yes yes yes yes yes 
N 442 442 442 442 442 442 
R-squared 0.8105 0.8136 0.8171 0.8694 0.8578 0.8644 
Wald test p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
The dependent variable is expressed in logarithmic terms. Superscripts */**/*** denote 10, 5, and 1 percent  significance 
levels. Number in parenthesis are panel corrected standard errors. 
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Table 6b - Reforms Index Determinants 
Dependent Variable: Reform Policies Index (?? )
I II III IV V VI
??? (dummy) -.1162***(.0430) 
-.0922**
(.0413) 
-.0606
(.0420) 
-.0655
(.0430) 
-.2059***
(.0438) 
-.1661***
(.0384) 
??????????????????????
-.2384
(.4304) 
-.2195
 (.4222) 
-.1058***
(.0403) 
-.1014**
(.0403) 
-.1485***
(.0410) 
-.1367***
(.0407) 
????????????????
.4208***
(.1123) 
.8578***
(.1963) 
.6533***
(.1380) 
????????????????
.5499***
(.1418) 
.6941***
(.1684) 
.7568***
(.1438) 
?????????? ???????????????
.1557***
 (.0221) 
.1592***
(.0212) 
.1644***
(.0205) 
.1648***
(.0206) 
.0666*
(.0365) 
.0738**
(.0349) 
????
.0338
(.0544) 
.0398
 (.0560) 
.0466
 (.0578) 
.0463
 (.0576) 
.0539
(.0565) 
.0576
(.0575) 
??????????????????????
? ???
.1499
(.4216) 
.1269
(.4135)     
???????????????? ? ???
-.6025***
(.1971)    
???????????????? ? ???
-.3155
(.1946) 
?????????? ???????????????
? ???     
.1428***
(.0444) 
.1366***
(.0419) 
???????? yes yes yes yes yes yes 
???? ??????? yes yes yes yes yes yes 
N 442 442 442 442 442 442 
R-squared 0.8107 0.8139 0.8177 0.8165 0.8616 0.8676 
Wald test p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
The dependent variable is expressed in logarithmic terms. Superscripts */**/*** denote 10, 5, and 1 percent  significance 
levels. Number in parenthesis are panel corrected standard errors. 
The econometric outputs confirm that the hypothesized 
determinants have shaped the reforms paths of these countries: 
they are lagged as it isthe past combination of political institutions 
with economic interests that drives the incentives to reform of the 
policy makers. In particular, allowing their slopes to differ (we 
interact each of them with the FSU dummy), we can understand 
whether they have a different importance depending onthe country 
group considered. Concerning natural resources (when both all 
natural resources and just oil and gas are taken into account), as the 
coefficients of the interaction term and the single variable (Table 
6a and 6b, first and second columns) are not statistically 
significant,we do not have evidence against the hypothesis that one 
slope over groups of countries suffices to express the effect of 
natural resources on the reforms index. Concerning trade openness 
and democratic institutions, instead,the proxies coefficients reveal 
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that relations with advanced market economies play a major role 
for the Central and Eastern European countries, whereas 
democratization has a greater effect among the Former Soviet 
Republics.
Discovered the relative effects of these forces for the reforms paths 
of these countries, we continue our study and develop a panel 
identification strategy that employs these new instruments18. At the 
first stage, we regress our reform policies index (expressed in 
logarithmic terms)on the lagged values of the rents coming from all 
the natural resources (and alternatively just from oil and natural 
gas), the nature of the political institutions, and the extent of the 
trade relations with advanced market economies (either the 
percentage of imports or the percentage of exports of the twelve 
core countries of the Euro area by trade partner). As preliminary 
tests reveal that heteroschedasticity,cross-sectional correlation and 
within panel AR(1) autocorrelation are important issues, we 
calculate panel-corrected standard error estimates of our linear 
cross-sectional time-series model. Then, at the second stage, we 
provide System-GMM estimates of thereforms index using the 
fitted series stemming from the first stage regression. In particular, 
the two stages approach is implemented taking into consideration 
the whole sample and then (as before)studying the impact of the 
reforms policies depending on the country-group and the stage of 
transition.
18 It is of course fundamental that these instruments influence economic 
development only via reforms policies. When specified as independent variables 
in Sys-GMM regressions, it seems they do not affect productivity growth 
significantly (Appendix B, Table B1). 
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Tables 7a and 7b show the regressions results of our dynamic 
instrumented approach. In particular, the former exhibits that all the 
forces conjectured to have driven the reform paths of these countries 
are statistically significant. We see that the rents accrued at time t-1, 
both those coming from all natural resources and those coming just 
from oil and natural gas, have affected negatively the reform policies 
index; that the earlier extent of trade relations with the Euro area 
(measured either in terms of imports or in terms of exports) has 
encouraged the reform paths; and that the evolution of the political 
institutions toward a democratic allocation of political power has 
benefited the economic environment. The goodness of fit of the 
regressions (Table 7a) is considerable, as the three core determinants 
are highly statistically significant. The other table (Table 7b) exhibits 
the second-stage regressions, where the reform policies index????? is 
the fitted series that comes from the correspondent column of the 
first-stage output. We can notice that the results are consistent with 
an estimated coefficient positive and statistically significant at one 
percent level.
Then, we check whether the evidence about the structural break and 
the existence of a different impact of reforms, according to the 
countries group considered, is confirmed implementing this 
“instrumented” system GMM estimator (Table 8b and 9b).The 
econometric output of Table 8b displays the second-stage estimated 
regressions depending on the instruments considered (columns abc
and d of Table 7a), when productivity is measured by Gdp per person 
employed; Table 9b, when it is measured by TFP.  
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We begin controlling for the group-specific dummy (Tables 8b and 
9b, columns IaIIbIIIcIVd), studying the slope coefficient of the 
core independent variable. The index estimated coefficient is 
statistically significantly and positive.This evidence is coherent 
with the results obtained before (Table 5) and proves that also 
when the instrumented estimates are used, the reform index has no 
considerable impact on the productivity growth paths of the 
countries belonging to the so called Eastern bloc.The second stage 
regressions cast doubts on the relevance of the reform process for 
the productivity growth paths of the Central Eastern European 
countries. Reform policies have instead a clear influence on 
productivity growth of the ex Soviet Republics: the relevance and 
positive impact of the reform policies are always stressed. We 
proceed testing for a structural break in the model, and as done 
before we include a dummy variable (period b) for the period 
following the dislocation one (1997 onwards). The regression 
results (Table 8b and 9b, columns VaVIbVIIc VIIID) display the 
estimated coefficients of the various ??????????? that are statistically 
significant and negative, which shows the existence of a structural 
break in the model. Also when instrumented, these estimation 
outputs prove that reforms matter during the dislocation period but 
then their importance decreases.The last regressions (Table 8b and 
9b, columns IXaXbXIcXIId) fully interact the fitted reform 
policies index??????with both dummies.In general, the estimated 
coefficients of the structural variable are consistent with those of 
Table 5. Only, when the index is interacted with the country-group 
dummy, this estimation approachgives a little bit overrated 
coefficient (mainly when productivity is assessed by GDP per 
person employed). The empirical tests reveal that the theoretical 
based identification strategy is supported by the results of both the 
Hansen and the Arellano-Bond test. 
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Conclusion
Starting from the previous evidence on the importance of reforms 
policy for the growth paths of transition economies, we investigate 
whether a different impact on productivity occurs between “types” 
of countries in transition and over time. Our estimation strategies 
prove that reforms commitment matter just for the countries that 
lived central planning in its pure and radical expression and that 
these policies help the productivity growth paths more in the first 
years after the Soviet Union breakdown than during the remainder 
of the period. Moreover, we document the reasons underlying the 
different stage of abandonment of communist institutions and 
examine why the Former Soviet Republics and the Central and 
Eastern European countries have made reforms at different speed 
and with different commitments.The natural resources 
endowments, the democratization paths and trade openness 
towards advanced market economies are identified as specific 
determinants, which largely explain the reforms development. 
According to the employed estimation strategies that control for 
the endogeneity of institutions, our results show that 
(specific)structural reforms affect economic development when the 
change and the improvement entailed is radical but beyond some 
years their effect is not enough to boost the economy. This should 
be taken as a caveat for policy makers: the same type of reforms 
supports economic growth in the short term, but their 
contemporaneous effect decreases over time.  
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